Implicit epistemic aspects of constructive logic by Sundholm, B.G.
Journal of Logic, Language, and Information 6: 191–212, 1997. 191
c
 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
Implicit Epistemic Aspects of Constructive Logic ?
G ¨ORAN SUNDHOLM
Faculteit der Wijsbegeerte, Matthias de Vrieshof 4, P.O. Box 9515, 2300 RA Leiden, the Netherlands
E-mail: sundholm@rullet.leidenuniv.nl
(Received 10 September 1996; in final form 22 October 1996)
Abstract. In the present paper I wish to regard constructive logic as a self-contained system for the
treatment of epistemological issues; the explanations of the constructivist logical notions are cast in
an epistemological mold already from the outset. The discussion offered here intends to make explicit
this implicit epistemic character of constructivism. Particular attention will be given to the intended
interpretation laid down by Heyting. This interpretation, especially as refined in the type-theoretical
work of Per Martin-Lo¨f, puts the system on par with the early efforts of Frege and Whitehead-Russell.
This quite recent work, however, has proved valuable not only in the philosophy and foundations
of mathematics, but has also found practical application in computer science, where the language
of constructivism serves as an implementable programming language, and within the philosophy of
language.?? My presentation will be carried out through a contrast with standard metamathematical
work.z In the course of the development I have occasion to offer some novel considerations (in
Sections 6 and 8) on the nature of proof and inference(-acts).
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1. Two Logico-Semantical Paradigms
The standard way of presenting a formal language turns it into an object of
(meta)mathematical study. Inductive definitions abound. The well-formed formu-
lae, as well as the derivations, are inductively given, and with the derivations also
the class of derivable objects. Further, the formal semantics offered will be of
the same sort. Mirroring the clauses in the inductive generation of the formulae,
one gives a metamathematical evaluation machinery for the assignment of truth-
values to formulae or other derivable objects.zz In its pristine form, this paradigm is
present already in beginner’s treatments of the propositional and predicate calculi.
One should note that so called metamathematical expressions, that is, inductively
? Text of an invited lecture given at the TARK VI conference at Renesse, the Netherlands, March
1996. I am indebted to Johan van Benthem for the invitation to speak at the conference, as well as
for his careful constructive comments on a first draft of the present paper, and to Per Martin-Lo¨f for
many conversations that have served to sharpen my thoughts on the topics covered herein.
?? Nordstro¨m et al. (1990) give an overview of the work in computer science, whereas Ranta (1995)
provides an impressive constructivist alternative to Montague Grammar using the richer type structure
of Martin-Lo¨f in place of the simple classical type theory of Church.
z Troelstra and van Dalen (1988) give an encyclopedic treatment of the metamathematics of
constructivism.
zz Monk (1976: Chapters 10 and 11) contains a detailed and careful exposition of these matters
along the intended lines.
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generated strings, or trees, of atomic metamathematical “signs”, are not made to
express anything, but on the contrary are themselves, like any other mathematical
objects expressed by means of ordinary linguistic expressions. Metamathematical
expressions are not tools for speaking with, but objects to be spoken about.
This paradigm became entrenched by the mid-thirties. Its intellectual roots
lie in the Hilbert program for the foundations of mathematics. These should be
made secure through the application of mathematical methods to the philosophical
reflection upon the mathematical formalism. In particular, the elementary proof
of a certain metamathematical reflection principle turned out to be the (Go¨del-
unobtainable) main desideratum. It is fair to say, however, that without the Hilbert
program, and the ensuing metamathematical codification by, say, Go¨del, Tarski,
and Bernays one would not have thought of studying formal languages consisting
of uninterpreted strings of objects.
This style of formalism has, of course, been extended to a wide variety of systems
of logic, going far beyond the easy examples of propositional and predicate calculi.
Thus, for example, well-known systems of epistemic and doxastic logic have been
designed, in order that the influence of explicitly epistemological features on the
inferential mechanisms of logic be amenable to study within the metamathematical
paradigm. Such formalisms use propositional operators
Kp and Bp
with the intended reading “p is known”, respectively, “p is believed”.? The present
attempt at treating the epistemic aspects of an interpreted formalism for constructive
logic should be compared with that of Shapiro (1985b) where the metamathematical
formalisms of epistemic logic are coupled with those of constructive arithmetic.
Here, though, the K-operator is read, not in the usual meaning as “known”, but
as knowable, which has certain interesting advantages: in particular, the problems
of logical omniscience disappear, because if the premises of a valid inference are
knowable, then, clearly, so is the conclusion.??
The metamathematical paradigm shift is brought out very clearly through a
comparison between the respective treatments of derivations offered by Frege and
Gentzen.z Frege did not study uninterpreted formal systems. On the contrary, his
main concern was to develop, and use, a sizable formal language adequate for
the expression of mathematics. A Fregean well-formed formula does not present
an object for metamathematical scrutiny: it expresses a content. Frege’s expres-
sions are offered as parts of meaningful language. The crucial differences can be
summarized in a table:
? See Hintikka (1962) and Lenzen (1978).
?? For more information concerning the properties of knowability in relation to the validity of
inference, see also Section 8 below.
z Frege (1893), Gentzen (1934–1935).
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FREGE GENTZEN
Formal language Interpreted Uninterpreted
Truth-bearers Propositions WFFs
Derivable objects Judgements WFFs
Inference from Known judgements Assumed WFFs
Logical key notion Truth Consequence
The WFFs of Gentzen play a double role: they serve as formalistic simulacra
both for the propositional bearers of truth and for the derivable (assertible) objects.
We shall, in the sequel, return to this circumstance and to the effects it has for the
semantic interpretation of Gentzen’s proof trees.
Frege’s attempted meaning explanations for his formal language can be found
in (1893: x29). Clearly, they are not part of the mathematics which the system is
designed to cover. On the contrary, a meaning explanation proper for the mathemat-
ical language is not itself mathematical in nature: one does not give a semantics for
the language of mathematics by doing further mathematics, for example, by proving
theorems. Bearing this in mind one should note that Tarski’s (meta)mathematical
recursion does not give meaning to a formula , but to a certain three-place relation
R(M; ; ):
The meaning given by the recursive definition to the relation R, namely that
the variable assignment  satisfies the WFF  in the structureM,
leaves the ontological and semantical status of the WFF  unchanged; of course, it
remains an uninterpreted metamathematical object to be talked about, and does not
become something with which we can express ourselves. Another clear difference
lies in Frege’s use of the turnstile and in the metamathematical use thereof, due to
Kleene and Rosser.? For the latter the turnstile serves as a theorem predicate. So
for them
j   
roughly means
there is an inductively generated tree of WFFs that obeys the rules of derivation
and which has got  as it last WFF.
For Frege, on the other hand, the turnstile serves as a force indicator, or as it
has come to be known, “assertion sign”. This means, in particular, that it is not a
predicate at all, owing to Geach’s (1965) Frege point, namely the circumstance that
sentences equipped with the assertion sign cannot be embedded in, for example, the
antecedents of implications. A similar use of the turnstile is found in Whitehead and
Russell (1910). They, however, do not offer a satisfactory meaning theory for their
? See Kleene (1952: 88) for the metamathematical turnstile.
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type theory, nor had Frege succeeded in his own attempt at providing a workable
meaning theory.?
The epistemological features of the two types of systems are radically different.
The systems of doxastic and epistemic logic are metamathematical formalisms
designed to express valid principles of reasoning concerning epistemic notions.
The formalisms chosen, however, are simple extensions of propositional logic and
the use of the propositional connectivesK andB treats claims as to knowledge and
belief as if they were propositions. The explicit link to epistemology is found in the
intuitive, pre-formal considerations that serve to motivate axioms and semantics.
The systems establish consequence relations between WFFs purporting to express
insights concerning knowledge and belief.
In the Frege-like, contentual, paradigm, on the other hand, knowledge claims
are part and parcel of the use of the system, but not in the form of propositional
operators. Owing to the presence of the assertion sign, one is able to express not just
(interrelations between) propositions, but actual assertions (“judgements”) with the
propositions as contents. An assertion, however, made through the utterance of a
declarative sentence, contains (implicit) claims, as to knowledge and truth, with
respect to the content expressed by the sentence in question. The strong epistemic
slant of an interpreted intuitionistic formalism will be made clear by the elaboration
of a schematic table:??
EPISTEMIC NOTION NON-EPISTEMIC NOTION
Judgement (assertion) Proposition
Demonstration of judgement Proof(-object) of proposition
Truth of judgement Truth of proposition
Intuitive/discursive Canonical/non-canonical
immediate/mediate direct/indirect
Inference Consequence
Validity of inference Holding of consequence
Assumption Assumption
that a judgment is true that a proposition is true
Hypothetical demonstration Dependent proof-object
Hypothetical judgement Implicational proposition
Premise Antecedent
Conclusion Consequent
? Wittgenstein’s Tractatus (1922) can be seen as an attempt to provide the lacking semantical
superstructure.
?? The first three rows of the table were given by Per Martin-Lo¨f, forthcoming.
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2. Intuitionistic Logic and the Two Paradigms
Intuitionistic logic, or as I shall prefer to call it, constructive logic, was conceived
of by Arend Heyting (1930), at the very time when metamathematical studies
of formal systems began to take off. In the seminal meaning theoretical works
(1930b, 1931, 1934), however, he was not concerned to give another metamath-
ematical interpretation, but rather to provide a constructive reading for the term
proposition. Thus, one would not begin with a formal axiomatization and seek a
suitable mathematical, possibly even formalized, semantics, for which to prove
a soundness theorem with respect to the formal axioms and rules. Instead, one
would have to explain what a proposition is, what it is for a proposition to be
true, and when one is entitled to assert the truth of a proposition, and then check
what truths can be asserted outright and what acts of inference are truth-preserving.
This approach explicitly and knowingly followed the paths trodden by Frege and
Whitehead-Russell. The use of the turnstile is that of an assertion sign.
Elsewhere (1983, 1993, 1994) I have given thorough treatments of the result-
ing meaning-theoretical views and accordingly I here confine myself to a short
summary of the crucial points:
(1) Propositions are explained in terms of proofs required for their truth.
But
(2) proofs are constructions,
and
(3) constructions are mathematical objects.
(4) A demonstrated theorem (assertion) to the effect that
proposition A is true
is not itself propositional in nature, but, when made
fully explicit, has the form
construction c is a proof of A.
In an emendation by Martin-Lo¨f:
(5) A judgement (theorem, assertion) is explained
in terms of what one has to know (what one must have
done) in order to have the right to make the assertion
(judgment) in question.
Thus:
(6) Propositions have proof-conditions.
Judgements have assertion-conditions.?
Note that thesis (4) sides with Frege, rather than with Gentzen, on the roles of
the truth-bearers and objects of assertion.
? See Martin-Lo¨f (1983: 26) and (forthcoming).
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3. Propositions, Truth and the Meaning of the Logical Constants
3.1. PROPOSITIONAL ALTERNATIVES
The constructivist explanation of the notion of proposition was given only after the
seminal work on the formalization of intuitionistic logic. A heated, and sometimes
very confused, controversy had arisen particularly in Belgian and French mathe-
matical circles concerning the proper interpretation of logic from an intuitionistic
standpoint and the constructivist explanation served as part of an essential clari-
fication of the issues.? The first formulation was cast in terms of problems, but
was speedily followed by other versions. A number of different, but essentially
equivalent formulations have been offered:
Proposition Proof Heyting (1934)
Intention Fulfillment Heyting (1931)
Problem Solution Heyting (1930)
Kolmogorov (1932)
Set Element (Curry-)Howard 1980
Martin-Lo¨f (1979)
Specification Program Martin-Lo¨f (1979)
Thus, in order to understand a proposition A, one must know what its proof-
objects are, that is, one must know when one has got the right to assert that
a is a proof of A.
In order to understand the essential equivalence between the various approaches
offered in the table it is worthwhile to work out a couple of examples. To each
proposition A we associate the problem A which is solved by finding a proof of
A and with each problem P we associate a proposition P  which is proved by
exhibiting a solution to P . The proposition A is the same as A, that is, has the
same proofs as A. In order to see this, let a be a proof of A. Then a is a solution
to the problem A, and so a is a proof of the proposition A. On the other hand,
assume that b is a proof of A. The b is a solution to the problem A, but, by the
explanation of the -problem, this is nothing but a proof of the proposition A. So
the sameness of A and A is established.
Similarly, with the proposition A associate the set M
A
whose elements are the
proofs of A and to each set S we associate the proposition P
S
whose proofs are
the elements of S. Then A and P
M
A
are equal propositions. Any proof of A is an
element of M
A
and hence a proof of P
M
A
. But a proof of P
M
A
is an element of
M
A
, which is a proof of A, and, once more, we are done.
? See Thiel (1988) and Franchella (1994) concerning the debate in question.
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3.2. IDENTITY CONDITIONS
Furthermore, given that “no entity without identity”, one must also know what it is
for two such proof-objects to be equal proofs of the proposition in question.? That
is, given that one knows that
a is a proof of A and that b is a proof of A,
one must also know when one is entitled to assert that
a is the same proof as b of A.
Knowledge of these two items suffices in order to know that
A is a proposition.
It does not suffice, though, for knowing the truth of the proposition in question.
3.3. TRUTH
In order to have the right to assert that
A is true,
one must not only know when one has the right to assert that
a is a proof of A;
one actually has to have found such a proof. That means that we construe the truth
of a proposition A as follows:
A is true = Proof(A) exists.
Note here that this explanation of truth for propositions is of an entirely non-
epistemic nature, and does not of itself yield that classical logic does not hold.
Similarly, proofs of propositions are not epistemic. They are ordinary mathematical
objects of various types, such as numbers and functions.
3.4. EXISTENCE
The existence claim, or judgement,
 exists,
where  is a general concept, or type, is not propositional in nature, that is, is
not explained by means of the existential quantifier. On the contrary, the latter is
explained in terms of the truth-condition for an existential proposition
(9x 2 D)P (x) is true = Proof((9x 2 D)P (x)) exists,
? Quine (1958: 23).
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where D is a set and P (x) a proposition whenever x 2 D. Thus the existential
quantifier is dependent on the other, more primitive notion of existence. (Of course,
in order to be completely fixed the truth-condition for the existential proposition
demands a further specification of the type Proof((9x 2 D)P (x)).? This will be
given below.)
The meaning of the existence claim is not given by a specification of a putative
proof-object, but by laying down what one has to know in order to have the right
to make the claim in question. In order to have the right to make the claim that
 exists
one must know some claim
a is an .??
It is only at this point, in virtue of the constructivist explanation of existence, that
classical logic is ruled out.
The above machinery allows one to give a neat definition of identity among
propositions, a problem which has sometimes been found vexing.
A is the same proposition as B,
when, according to the meaning-explanations for A and for B, any proof of A is
a proof of B and vice versa (and similarly for equal proofs of A which have to be
equal proofs of B and vice versa).z
3.5. LOGICAL CONSTANTS
The above explanations pertain to propositions in general. The way the general
theory applies to the logical constants is of crucial importance for grasping and
evaluating the constructivist paradigm as a rival to its classical alternatives. In a
streamlined modern version based on the type theory of Martin-Lo¨f they run as
follows:zz
? Owing to the isomorphism between a proposition and the set of its proof-objects, I shall not
adhere to the Proof(A) notation in the sequel.
?? The outline of how to obtain the truth-conditions for constructive propositions is based on the
work of Per Martin-Lo¨f, e.g. (1994).
z The application of the type-theoretical machinery to problems concerning the identity of propo-
sitions is considered in some detail in my work (1994b).
zz See Nordstro¨m et al. (1990: Ch. 2). These proof-objects are given in so called polymorphic form.
Below it will be indicated how to included more information so as to obtain the monomorphic form.
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? There are no proofs for ?.
& When a is a proof for A and b is a proof for B,
ha; bi is a proof for A&B.
_ When a is a proof for A, i(a) is a proof for A _B.
When b is a proof for B, j(a) is a proof for A _B.
 When b is a proof for B, provided x is a proof for A,
x:b is a proof for A  B.
8 When D is a set, P is a proposition, provided that x 2 D, and
b is a proof for P , provided x 2 D, xb is a proof for (8x 2 D)P .
9 When D is a set, P is a proposition, provided that x 2 D,
a 2 D, and b is a proof for P [a=x], ha; bi is a proof for (9x 2 D)P .
Note here that there is nothing specifically constructive about the above expla-
nations of the logical constants in terms of proof-objects. They make perfect sense
also from a classical point of view, and it is only when coupled to the explanation
of truth as the constructive existence of a proof-object that classical logic is ruled
out.? In epistemic logic, on the other hand, it is taken for granted that the logical
constants satisfy the classical laws of logic and the epistemic aspects are added
explicitly in terms of the operator K . The epistemic constraints of constructivism
enter via the judgemental explanation of existence.
3.6. DIRECT VS. INDIRECT PROOF-OBJECTS. NORMALIZATION STEPS
There remains one more point to make concerning these explanations. What is
given here are the explanations for how direct proofs of composite propositions
are formed from proofs of their constituents. In Gentzen’s terminology they are
formed by means of introduction rules. Proofs formed by other means, for example,
through applications of elimination rules, will not be in direct form. In order that
they be permissible, their use is held accountable to the explanations offered in
terms of direct proofs: any proof must be evaluable to canonical form by certain
normalization steps, in just the same way as numerical terms that are not in the form
of a numeral must be convertible to a numeral by means of recursion equations.
? Indeed, as Troelstra-Van Dalen (1988: Vol. I, 32–33) rightly observe the proof-explanations are
neutral from an epistemological point of view, just like Tarski’s T-sentences. It all depends on the
meta-theory one is willing to allow.
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Implication and conjunction may serve as examples to elucidate matters here,
where, in comparison with the above table, I include a fair number of further
information in the proof-objects so as to ensure certain desirable properties such as
decidability of type-checking, etc., and the colon will be used for “is a proof of”.?
Proof-objects can be formed by means of a &-introduction
a : A b : B
&I(A;B; a; b) : A&B
and by means of a &-elimination
c : A&B
&E
l
(A;B; c) : A
&E
r
(A;B; c) : B:
In order to ensure the adequacy of the rules, the introduction and elimination
operators, by stipulation, obey the following evaluation rules:
a : A b : B
&
l
(A;B;&I(A;B; a; b)) = a : A
&
r
(A;B;&I(A;B; a; b)) = b : B:
These are nothing but linearized versions of Prawitz’s reduction steps for Natural
Deduction derivations, which say that an introduction followed immediately by an
elimination is removable.?? For example,
j j
A B
A&B
A
j
reduces to
j
A
j
Similarly for the implication case. The relevant rules are:
b : B(x : A)
 I(A;B; (x)b : A  B
for the formation of proof-objects by means of implication-introduction. Here the
premise means that b is a proof of B, on the assumption that x is a proof of A, and
(x)b is the function formed by abstraction from b.
The matching elimination rule for implication is the well-known modus ponens
inference-principle:
c : A  B a : A
 E(A;B; c; a) : B
? The system will be monomorphic. See Nordstro¨m et al. (1990: Part III).
?? Prawitz (1965, 1971).
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The corresponding linearized -reduction step is:
b : B(x : A) a : A
 E(A;B; I(A;B; (x)b); a) = ((x)b)(a)
= b[a=x] : B:?
Similar linearizations are readily carried out also for the other logical operators.
The material as set out in Section 3 has, under various guises, been of con-
siderable importance in the philosophy of language, owing to its use by Michael
Dummett in a proposal for an anti-realist theory of meaning.??
4. Sentence, Proposition and Judgement
We consider a standard example.z The sentence S:
Euler’s constant C is rational.
expresses a proposition, namely the proposition that Euler’s constantC is rational.
In order to substantiate this claim we need to tell what condition has to be satisfied
by a proof-object for the proposition expressed by S, namely, the condition that
there be a pair (p; q) of integers such that p=q = C , together with a proof(-object)
that this is the case. The proposition held true inS is indicated by the nominalization
that S.
Note here that we can, and normally do, assert that Euler’s constant is rational
through an utterance of S. An utterance of the nominalization, though, will not
produce the assertion of S, but will indicate the proposition that S. In order to get
back to a sentential phrase, that can be used for making the assertion that Euler’s
constant is rational, we need to append the phrase “is true” to the propositional
nominalization “that S”, whereby we get
that Euler’s constant C is rational is true,
which sentence can, yet again, be used for making the assertion that C is rational.
In terminology introduced by Hare, S is the sentence, “that S” expresses its
phrastic, “is true” indicates its tropic and the assertoric force of the utterance of
S with which the assertion that C is rational is made, is the neustic.zz Similarly,
the Wittgenstein–Stenius terminology can be used which considers the sentence-
radical “that S” corresponding to the sentence S.{ In order to distinguish between
? The square-bracket notation, of course, indicates the result of performing the substitution of a
for x in b. See also footnote on p. 207.
?? The topic is surveyed in my 1986 work where a reasonably thorough bibliography is given to
the important works of Dummett and Prawitz.
z Taken from Heyting (1930a).
zz Hare (1970).
{ Stenius (1960: Chapter IX).
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the proposition that S, the judgement that S is true, and the judgement made in a
completed assertion that S is true, I shall, following Martin-Lo¨f, use the respective
terminology “proposition”, “judgement (simpliciter)”, and “judgement made”.?
Above I already remarked that the notions of truth and proof with respect
to propositions were non-epistemic. For judgements matters are different. The
notion of judgement is explained in terms of what one must know (must have
accomplished) in order to have the right to make the judgment in question. The
proof of a judgement made is the epistemic process of demonstration, whereby the
judgement becomes known.
When a judgment has become known, or evident, in virtue of its being demon-
strated, it is clearly true. Truth is here taken in an actual sense of being known,
or evident.?? However, before a mathematical judgment became known it could
become known. In the potential sense a judgement is true when it is demonstrable
(evidenceable, knowable, assertible, justifiable, warrantable).
The discussion can be summarized in a schema:
it has been laid down
J is a judgement (simpliciter) = what one has to know in
order to have the right to
make the judgment J .
J is known,
evident,
in the actual sense = demonstrated,
= warranted,
justified,
asserted.
J is true
J is knowable,
n evidenceable,
in the potential sense = demonstrable,
warrantable,
justifiable,
assertible.
All of these notions are, of course, epistemic, that is, knowledge-dependent.z
? (1983, 1987, 1991).
??
“Evidence” has at least two relevant meanings.
a. It stands for the property of being evident.
b. “My lord, I beg leave to enter exhibit one into evidence.” “ He is unable to find enough evidence
in the text to warrant such an outrageous claim concerning the authorship of Shakespeare’s
works.” Here “piece of evidence” comes close to “proof-object”.
z In this section I am heavily indebted to Martin-Lo¨f (1991, forthcoming).
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5. Gentzen’s Two Versions of Natural Deduction
In view of the semantics in terms of canonical proof-objects based on introduction
rules, it is to be expected that intuitionistic deductions will run especially smoothly
when carried out in Natural Deduction format.? Gentzen, working within the Hilbert
paradigm, did not provide a semantical interpretation for his derivations. Thus the
interesting problem arises to assign a meaning to Gentzen proof-trees when used
within the Heyting framework. It is then of great importance to distinguish between
the two different formulations offered by Gentzen for the setting out of Natural
Deduction derivation-trees. This is not always done, and when it is done the two
versions are often seen just as trivial notational variants.?? This, however, turns out
not to be the case when one considers matters of semantics.
Gentzen’s first version (1934–1935) is the well-known Natural Deduction style
formalism that was made popular by Prawitz (1965). Here derivations are finite
formula-trees built up from assumptions (and possibly some axioms), according to
the introduction and elimination rules. The key-notion is that of derivability from
assumptions. At the nodes of such a derivation-tree  single formulae are located:
 :
A1; A2; : : : ; A
k
 
 

A
When such a tree can be given one says that A is derivable from the assumptions
A1, A2, : : : , A
k
.
Gentzen’s other version of Natural Deduction was given in the 1936 First
consistency proof. Here a sequential formulation is used. The derivable objects are
not formulae, but sequents
A1; A2; : : : ; A
k
) C;
with the intuitive readings either that C is derivable from the assumptions A1, A2,
: : : , A
k
, or that C is true, when A1, A2, : : : , A
k
are all true.
The derivations will all begin with, either logical or mathematical, axioms. The
former take the form
A1; A2; : : : ; A
k
) A
i
; i = 1; 2; : : : ; k;
and correspond to the making of assumptions, whereas the latter take the forms
F;B1; : : : ; B
k
) C and B1; : : : ; B
k
) E;
? This was actually seen already by Heyting in a little-known series of Dutch survey articles
beginning with (1935).
?? For instance, by Prawitz (1971).
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where F and E are false, respectively, true arithmetical equations. The derivation
trees will no longer use assumptions, but will invariably start from axioms, be they
logical or arithmetical. In Gentzen’s sequent calculus from (1934–1935) all logical
rules are (left and right) introduction rules. Here in this sequential formulation of
Natural Deduction one uses both introduction and elimination rules that all operate
to the right of the arrow.
We are left with two questions: What are the semantic interpretations of deriva-
tions in
(i) standard Natural Deduction, and
(ii) in sequential Natural Deduction?
In Section 7.4 I propose an answer to these questions.
6. Ambiguities of Proof: Acts, Objects and Traces
The constructivist’s use of proofs as the semantical corner-stones of his logical edi-
fice is, prima facie, not unproblematic, owing to the delicate interplay between the
objective and subjective aspects of proof. Proofs definitely should carry subjective
epistemological conviction: clearly, in some sense, an alleged proof that does not
convince is not a real proof. On the other hand, proofs are objectively accessible,
for example, from the pages of mathematical journals. Added to this general ten-
sion between the subjective and objective aspects of proof (which applies in one
form or another to any conception of proof, be it intuitionistic or not) there is the
particular feature of Heyting’s proofs that they are mathematical objects (which,
of course, may serve to account for their objectivity. Why these objects should be
epistemologically convincing remains puzzling, though).
A proof, or perhaps better a demonstration, is, according to the dictionary
definition what makes something known, or evident. What makes evident is the
act of getting to know. Primarily then, proof is taken in the sense of the act
of proving, which obviously accounts for the subjective epistemological power:
proofs are defined as acts of making evident. The object of such an act of proving
is the theorem proved (assertion made). The act is one of construction. What gets
constructed in the act is a certain construction-object, namely, a proof-object for
the proposition that serves as content for the assertion in question. In the assertion
truth is ascribed to the proposition. The proof-object is one of the objective features
of proof. One demonstrates the truth of a certain content through the production
of a matching object – the “proof” – which has to satisfy certain conditions,
depending on the proposition in question. Such an object, however, is just that: a
mathematical object. This seems too meager a notion to carry the epistemological
burden of objectivity: we search for a notion of proof which is both subjectively
convincing and intersubjectively accessible.
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Here the notion of the trace, or track, of an act comes handy. Consider, say, the
act of running a cross-country skiing tour.? The object obtained (the goal reached)
through the act is clearly the end-destination. However, in this case literally, but
for the object gained, the completed act has left a track, or trace, which can be
followed by other sportsmen to achieve the same end. Thus the track left by the act
serves as an inter-subjective blueprint for carrying out acts obtaining the object of
the original act in question. Similarly, the score-sheets in music and the recipes of
culinary art can be viewed as such act-traces that can be followed to (re)gain the
relevant objects. In outline the notions are related as follows:
Act ) object
= n
Process Trace
When we apply the notion of an act trace to mathematical demonstrations, we
get the desired objective notion of proof. The traces of these mathematical acts
of demonstration grace the pages of our mathematical texts, or can be found as
chalk-marks on blackboards, etc. The specialization of the above general table to
proof-acts yields:
Demonstration ) Theorem
= n
Proof act Public proof
Also the notion of construction can profitably be brought under this scheme:
Construction ) Construction-object
= n
Process Blue-print
Note here that an act of demonstration eo ipso comprises an act of constructing a
suitable construction-object.??
7. Assumption, Consequence, and Implication
7.1. OPEN CONSEQUENCES
Let us consider the making of an assumption, for example, that the proposition A
is true. Under this assumption various other propositions may be true and we may
also want to assert that B is true under the assumption that A is true, in symbols
B true (A true).
? I owe the example, as well as the notion of track, to Martin-Lo¨f, who introduced them in an
unpublished Paris talk 1992.
?? Essentially the last set of distinctions pertaining to constructions were given already in my 1983
work.
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How should such a judgement be understood? Ordinary truth
: : : is true
demands the existence of a proof-object. Hypothetical truth
: : : is true (A is true)
demands the existence of a proof-object given a proof x : A. Thus one is entitled
to make the (hypothetical) judgement
B true (A true),
where A and B are propositions, when one has found a proof-object b : B, depen-
dent upon the assumption x : A. Such a proof-object b is nothing but a function in
the old-fashioned sense, where application is effected through substitution. What
then does a judgement of the form
b : B(x : A)
mean, that is, when can such a judgement be made? One has the right to make this
judgement whenever one knows that b[a=x] : B, provided that a : A, that is, when
the inferences
a : A
b[a=x] : B
are valid.
Judgements of the form
B true (A1 true, A2 true, : : : , A
k
true)
can be called open consequences. Such a consequence holds when a dependent
proof-object b exists that depends on assumed proof-objects in the various A’s.?
A demonstration that an hypothetical judgment holds will not be hypothetical,
though, but will establish its conclusion, namely that a certain hypothetical proof
exists, unconditionally.??
7.2. CLOSED CONSEQUENCES (for the expert proof theorist)
Open consequences have to be contrasted with the closed (possibly higher lev-
el) consequences introduced by Schro¨der-Heister.z Here the order between the
assumptions is essential. A closed consequence
(A1; A2; : : : ; A
k
) ) C;
? Note here that the order of the assumptions is not essential since the dependent proof-object is
a function (in the old-fashioned sense) applied by means of substitution.
?? This as well as the following paragraph is indebted to the type theory of Martin-Lo¨f as well as
to many conversations with him.
z Schro¨der-Heister (1981) and many later works.
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where A1, A2, : : : , A
k
and C are propositions, holds when a function (in the
modern sense an object) of the function type
(A1; A2; : : : ; A
k
)C
exists. A (closed) consequence demands for its holding the existence of a cer-
tain function, its verification-object.? Thus we have here a perfect parallel to the
definition
A true =def Proof(A) exists,
in that
(A1; A2; : : : ; A
k
) ) C holds
=def
(Proof(A1), Proof(A2), : : : , Proof(A
k
))Proof(C) exists.
This explanation of closed sequences makes it perfectly clear that the rule
(A) ) B holds A true
B true
is valid since it reduces to a special case of the rule
() exists  exists
 exists:
But this rule is valid since
f : ()b a : 
f(a) : 
is a valid rule.
In order to form a closed consequence we need an open consequence:
b : B(x : A)
(x)b : (A)B
is the rule in question, and, when a : A, application runs smoothly,
((x)b)(a) = b[a=x] : B:??
? Which accounts for the need for order: a function is applied to arguments in a certain order,
whereas a substitution can be simultaneous.
?? In order to understand the idea consider the elimination rule for  cast in the same form as that
of disjunction:
(A)) B holds
j
A  B true C true
C true
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Thus, application in the modern sense is reduced to an instance of application in
the old-fashioned sense, that is, substitution.
7.3. IMPLICATION AND CONSEQUENCE. LOGICAL TRUTH AND LOGICAL
CONSEQUENCE
Furthermore, note that the implicational proposition
A  B is true if and only if the (closed) consequence (A) ) B holds.
The relevant proof-, respectively verification-objects are readily constructed from
one another. Similarly, the consequence holds logically, in all instances, when the
proposition is logically true, that is, is a tautology, that is, is true, come what may,
independently of what is the case.?
7.4. THE SEMANTIC INTERPRETATION OF NATURAL DEDUCTION
Enough distinctions have now been drawn in order to answer the above questions
concerning the semantic interpretation of Natural Deduction derivations. In the
standard (1934–1935) version, the derivation trees, along Curry–Howard lines,
stand for hypothetical proof-objects.
In the (1936) version, on the other hand, the derivations stand for the traces
of acts of demonstration that demonstrate that certain Natural Deduction proof-
trees exist, that is, that certain dependent proof-objects exist, that is, that certain
hypothetical judgments (open consequences) hold.??
From this perspective the machinery of the constructive logical calculi becomes
geared to proof(-object)-manipulation, in much the same way that the classical
perspective from the Tractatus, or its refinement in model theory, is geared to the
This calls for the use of a closed sequent when fully elucidated in terms of proof and verification
objects:
z : (A)B
j
d : A  B c : C
 E(A;B;C; d; (z)c) : C
The second premise becomes incomprehensible if the closed consequence (A) ) B were to be
replaced with an open consequence B true (A true), or, in explicit form, incorporating the relevant
proof-objects, b : B(x : A); the variable xwould remain free and could not be bound. The evaluation
rule corresponding to the -reduction from Section 3.6 above becomes:
 E(A;B;C; I(A;B; (x)b); (z)c) = c[(x)b=z] : C
? These, of course, are formulations used in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus (1922).
?? It is often said that the sequent calculus is a meta-calculus that shows how to build Natural
Deduction derivations. The latter stand for (dependent) proof-objects, so the sequent calculus provides
blueprints for how to find proof-objects that serve to verify the holding of (open) consequences, that
is, the Gentzen sequents in question.
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manipulation of states of affairs (in formal structures), given that certain other
states of affairs obtain.
8. Inference and Validity
The validity of an inference is often conflated with the (logical) holding of a
consequence. A typical explanation in a standard text (no names, no pack-drill!)
could run
the inference 1, 2, : : : , n= is valid
iff
the conclusion  is true whenever all the premises 1, 2, : : : , n are true.
However, what is here defined is not the epistemic notion of the validity of
an inference: there is no reference whatever to knowledge in this explanation.
On the contrary, what is defined is the non-epistemic notion of a consequence’s
holding logically.? Indeed, a straightforward constructivization would demand the
existence of a function f that serves as a verification-object for the explanans,
which gives us nothing but the holding of a consequence relation. Consequences
are not inferences. Primarily, an inference is a mediate act of judgment, in which
a judgment is made, given that certain other judgments are known. Consequences,
on the other hand, are relations between propositions.
How then should we define the validity of an inference? It will come as no
surprise that the act/trace/object distinction proves handy also here. The relevant
diagram of the type offered above in Section 6 is:
Inference ) Conclusion
= n
Act Trace,
inference-
figure
The crucial observation towards an answer is the following:
A consequence that holds preserves the truth of propositions, whereas a valid
inference preserves the truth of judgements.
Consider a schematic inference(-trace) I:
J1; J2; : : : ; Jn
J
:
? For the disbelieving classical logician: there is nothing specifically non-constructive or con-
structive about this notion of consequence. What consequences hold (logically) depends on what
principles one can avail oneself to in the meta-theory. In particular, without strong non-constructive
principles in the meta-theory, no non-constructive consequence relation can be seen to hold either
logically or simpliciter.
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What does the validity of such an inference demand? Well, we seek a condition
on the trace-schema I such that acts carried out according to his schema will yield
evident conclusions J , given the epistemic assumptions that the premises J1, J2,
: : : , J
n
are all known.
As a first attempt at such a condition try that the conclusion judgement J be
true, when the premise judgments J1, J2, : : : , Jn are all true. Should truth here be
taken in the sense of actual truth? The putative validity-condition then becomes: If
all of J1, J2, : : : , Jn are evident, then so is J . Hence, if the premises are unknown,
the condition is fulfilled and the inference valid. Thus, all inferences from unknown
premises are blindly valid, when validity is read in the sense of “preserves actual
truth”. This, clearly, will not do.
Accordingly preservation of potential truth (=knowability) seems to be what is
involved. But is it actual, or potential, preservation of knowability that is called
for? The potential validity demands that the conclusion can be made evident when
the premises can be made evident. This is the case when there exists a chain of
axioms and immediately evident inferences linking the premises to the conclusion.
In order that I have the right to carry out the mediate act of inference the existence
of such a chain must not only be knowable, but actually known. Then, from known
premises, I gain knowledge of the conclusion. The inference I is (actually) valid
when, assuming that the premises are knowable (known), a chain of immediately
evident inferences and axioms from premises to conclusion can be found (is known).
An immediate inference is valid when the conclusion can immediately be made
upon the assumption that the premises are known. The immediately evident infer-
ences and axioms finally draw their validity from the nature of the concepts that
occur in the judgements that serve as premises and conclusions respectively, of the
inference in question. They are analytic in the sense of Kant. The purpose of the
chain of immediate evidences linking the premises and conclusion of a valid infer-
ence is to extend this property of analytic containment also to mediate inferences.
Thus, an inference is valid if the conclusion is analytically contained in the premis-
es. This theory of “analytic containment” concerning the validity of inference goes
back to Aristotle and Abelard. A prominent modern adherent is Go¨del.
In the realist case, well known from Bolzano’s Wissenschaftslehre, the lynch-
pin around which the whole construction of logic revolves is that of propositional
truth. The validity of an act of judgment is reduced to the correctness (truth) of
the judgement made. The judgement that the proposition A is true is correct (true)
if the proposition A really is true, and so in the end, propositional truth is what
everything boils down to. Similarly for inferences:
A1 is true, : : : , A
k
is true
C is true
is valid (according to Bolzano) if the consequence
C true (A1 true, : : : , A
k
true) holds logically.
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These reductions of judgmental correctness and inferential validity are problematic,
though, since they construe blind judgements and inferences as correct respectively
valid. By a blind judgement one understands a judgment made, which happens to
agree with a knowable judgment, but that was itself made without evidence, and
similarly for inference. I, for one, consider this a serious weakness in the classical
logico-epistemological view.
On the constructivist theory that I have been concerned to develop here, however,
all priorities are reversed and the problems concerning blind, yet valid, inferences
are obviated, since the (actual) validity of an inference depends on actual possession
of an evidential chain.
For the reversal of the priorities, finally, consider, say, the truth of an implica-
tional proposition, which is reduced to the existence of a (canonical) introductory
proof-object, and this in turn depends on the existence of a dependent proof-object
for a hypothetical truth. This in turn is dependent upon the validity of a number
of inferences, that is, mediate acts of judgment. Thus, the validity of the act of
demonstration is here the linch-pin, and not that of propositional truth.
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